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Abstract The Internet is an important focus of attention for those concerned with
issues of extended cognition. In particular, the application of active externalist the-
orizing to the Internet gives rise to the notion of Internet-extended cognition: the
idea that the Internet can (on occasion) form part of an integrated nexus of material
elements that serves as the realization base for human mental states and processes.
The current review attempts to survey a range of issues and controversies that arise
in respect of the notion of Internet-extended cognition. These include the issue of
whether the Internet, as a technological system, is able to support real-world cases
of cognitive extension. It also includes issues concerning the cognitive and epistemic
impacts of the Internet. Finally, the review highlights a range of issues and con-
cerns that have not been the focus of previous philosophical attention. These include
issues of ‘network-extended cognitive bloat’, ‘conjoined minds’, and an entirely
new form of cognitive extension that goes under the heading of ‘human-extended
machine cognition’. Together, these issues serve to highlight the value and impor-
tance of Internet-extended cognition to contemporary philosophical debates about
the extended mind. In particular, the notion of Internet-extended cognition has the
potential to highlight points of philosophical progress that are not easily revealed
by the kind of technologically low-grade cases that tend to animate the majority of
philosophical discussions in this area.
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1 Introduction
A common focus of discussion in the sciences of the Web and Internet is the issue
of ‘boundary dissolution’. The Internet is thus sometimes seen to be blurring the tra-
ditional distinction between ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ (Gant and Kiesler 2001), between
the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ (Thompson 2011), between the ‘real’ and the ‘vir-
tual’ (Floridi 2014), between the ‘human’ and the ‘machine’ (Lupton 2013; Warwick
2015; Verbeek 2009), and between the ‘social’ and the ‘technological’ (see Smart
and Shadbolt 2014). An additional form of boundary dissolution can be found in
debates regarding the cognitive and epistemic impacts of the Internet. The main focus
of attention, in this case, is the extent to which the Internet supports a form of cog-
nitively potent bio-technological hybridization, one in which the informational and
technological elements of the Internet can be seen as literal elements of the physical
fabric that realizes human mental states and processes. The philosophical backdrop
to this debate centers on the notions of active externalism, extended cognition, cogni-
tive extension and the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary
2010).1 What all these locutions have in common is a commitment to the idea that
the causally active physical vehicles of cognitive states and processes can (on occa-
sion) extend beyond the biological boundaries of the individual cognitive agent to
include elements drawn from the surrounding technological and social environment.
When we apply this idea to the Internet, we arrive at the notion of ‘Internet-extended
cognition’, or the idea that the Internet can (on occasion) form part of an integrated
nexus of material elements that participates in the mechanistic realization of human
mental states and processes (see Smart 2012).
Extended cognition has emerged as a major focus of theoretical and empirical inter-
est for those working in the sciences of the mind. One of the reasons for this is
its ability to account for the rather distinctive set of cognitive capabilities that are
deemed to be the hallmark of human cognizing. Cognitive extension is thus seen to
lie at the root of an important form of cognitive enhancement for our species (Clark
2008), and this makes the Internet a critical focus of attention for those who are
concerned with issues of cognitive performance and cognitive well-being (e.g. Loh
and Kanai 2016;Carr 2010;Wegner and Ward 2013;Smart 2013). Inasmuch as we
accept the idea that the Internet forms part of the supervenience base for human mental
states and process, then it is clearly important that we seek to understand the way in
which the Internet is poised to help (or hinder) our species-specific cognitive capabilities.
Issues of Internet-extended cognition are also relevant to philosophical debates
regarding the foundational notion of cognitive extension. In particular, the Internet
has the potential to reveal issues and concerns that might not otherwise have been
brought into the philosophical spotlight. Such issues and concerns are of crucial
importance inasmuch as they help to shape the course of future philosophical debates.
1For the purposes of this paper, I will treat these terms as largely synonymous. The notion of an ‘Internet-
extended mind’ should thus be seen as equivalent to the notion of an ‘Internet-extended cognitive system’.
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The present paper attempts to survey at least some of the issues and controversies
that surround recent attempts to apply active externalist theorizing to the Internet.
For the most part, the focus of the review is restricted to issues that have arisen as
the result of previous philosophical work (Staley 2014; Halpin 2013; Halpin et al.
2010; Smart 2012; 2014; in press; Smart et al. in press). Beyond this, however,
the review also highlights issues that are (at best) only weakly represented in the
current philosophical literature. These include issues of ‘network-extended cognitive
bloat’ (see Section 3), ‘conjoined minds’ (see Section 4) and a new form of extended
cognition that goes under the heading of ‘human-extended machine cognition’ (see
Section 7).
2 Web-Extended Minds
Although there have been a number of attempts to analyze the Internet from an active
externalist perspective (see Staley 2014;Smart et al. in press), by far the greatest level
of attention has been directed to a specific application of the Internet, namely the
World Wide Web (Smart 2012; 2013; 2014; Halpin et al. 2010; Halpin 2013). Such
work is relevant to the present discussion in the sense that the Web is commonly seen
as a component of the Internet. The issues that arise in relation to Web-based forms
of cognitive extension are thus part of a broader array of issues that are relevant to
the more general topic of Internet-extended cognition.
The most explicit application of active externalist theorizing to the Web comes
in the form of the ‘Web-extended mind hypothesis’ (Smart 2012). This is the idea
that ‘the technological and informational elements of the Web can (at least some-
times) serve as part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states
and processes’ (Smart 2012, p. 447). Although on the surface this looks to be a
rather straightforward application of active externalist theorizing to a particular kind
of technological system, the term ‘Web-extended mind’ is one that warrants a degree
of careful analytic scrutiny. In particular, previous treatments of Web-extended cog-
nition have tended to overlook the need to provide a clear and explicit definition of
what is meant by the ‘Web’. This is important, because in the absence of an under-
standing of what the Web is, it is difficult, to say the least, to make sense of the term
‘Web-extended mind’. Part of my aim in this section is to clarify our understanding
of what is meant by the terms ‘World Wide Web’, ‘Web-based system’, and ‘Web-
extended mind’. In particular, I suggest that we should see a Web-extended mind as
a bio-technologically hybrid cognitive organization that leads a dual life as both a
Web-based system and an extended cognitive system (see Section 2.1).
Another aim of this section is to explore the extent to which the Web is able to
support real-world cases of cognitive extension. Does the nature of our interaction
with the Web allow for the emergence of actual extended cognitive systems, or are
Web-extended minds merely a matter of theoretical interest and speculation? One
way of making progress on this issue is to refer to the criteria that have been used
to evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. Perhaps the most well known of
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these criteria (although by no means the only ones2) are those proposed by Clark and
Chalmers (1998) as part of their seminal work on the extended mind. The criteria
in question are informed by a classic thought experiment involving a mnemonically
impaired individual, called Otto, and a conventional, paper-based notebook. As is
noted by Clark (2011), the aim of this particular thought experiment was to
...convince the reader that, under certain conditions, the coarse functional role
of a bio-external encoding could be sufficiently similar to that of a persisting
internal encoding as to mandate similar treatment, revealing the non-biological
resource as part of the physical machinery underpinning some of an agent’s
genuine mental states. (Clark 2011, p. 448)
As Clark and Chalmers are quick to note, however, not every form of bio-
technological or bio-artifactual coupling seems to invite treatment in cognitive terms.
‘There would’, as Clark (1997) suggests, ‘be little value in an analysis that credited
me with knowing all the facts in the Encyclopaedia Britannica just because I paid
the monthly installments and found space for it in my garage’ (p. 217).
What, then, are the conditions under which we should count a set of bio-external
resources (such as Web resources) as proper parts of the machinery of the mind? In
answering this question, Clark and Chalmers (1998) proposed a set of criteria that
have come to be known as the ‘trust and glue’ criteria (see Clark 2010b). The criteria,
as presented by Clark (2010b, p. 46), are as follows:
– ‘That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked’. [Availability
Criterion]
– ‘That any information thus retrieved [from the resource] be more or less automat-
ically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the
opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy
as something retrieved clearly from biological memory’. [Trust Criterion]
– ‘That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and
when required’. [Accessibility Criterion]
One way of evaluating the extent to which the Web is able to support extended
cognition is thus by reflecting on the kinds of interaction that we currently have with
the Web. We can then assess whether these kinds of interactive engagement satisfy
the demands of the trust and glue criteria. This is the approach adopted by the current
section. Although there is no doubt much more work to be done here—in particular,
there are a number of other criteria that could be the focus of future analytic efforts
(see Heersmink 2015; Clowes 2015; Sterelny 2010; Palermos 2014b)—this kind of
analysis does reveal a range of issues that are likely to shape the profile of future
philosophical debates in this area.
2A range of criteria have been discussed in the extended mind literature. Aside from the criteria of trust,
availability and accessibility (Clark 2010b), other criteria include the need for continuous forms of recipro-
cal interaction between the agent and bio-external artefact (Palermos 2014b) and the need for the external
resource to be subject to what is called ‘epistemic possession’ (Clowes 2015). Some have even sought
to develop multi-dimensional frameworks to support the assessment and evaluation of extended cognitive
systems (see Heersmink 2015).
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2.1 Cognitive Systems and the Web
In order to understand what is meant by the notion of a Web-extended mind, we first
need to understand what is meant by the ‘Web’. In a general sense, the Web can be
defined as follows:
(World Wide Web) The Web is a set of globally-distributed resources, where
the resources in question are identified using Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs) and accessed using a specific Internet protocol, namely HyperText
Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
Note that nothing in this definition constrains the nature of the resources that com-
prise the Web: anything that is accessed using a combination of URIs and HTTP is, by
definition, a Web resource and thus forms part of what we call the Web. Having said
that, our conventional use of the Web centers on a particular set of resources, namely
hypertext files (or Web pages). These ‘documents’ rely on a specific kind of markup
language, such as HyperText Markup Language (HTML), and they often include
references to other (embedded) resources, such as Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) spec-
ifications, JavaScript code and multimedia content (e.g. images and video). The Web
can, however, consist of other kinds of resources. Thus, in addition to seeing the Web
as a globally interlinked repository of HTML-formatted documents, we can also see
the Web as a globally interlinked repository of data assets that rely on other kinds of
markup language. This provides us with an alternative vision of the Web, one which
has come to be known as the ‘Linked Data Web’ or the ‘Web of Data’ (see Heath and
Bizer 2011). Other kinds of ‘Web’ are also beginning to emerge based on the kinds
of resources that are accessed using HTTP mechanisms and URI naming schemes. In
addition to the Web of Data, for example, recent work in Web and Internet Science
(WAIS) has focused on the Semantic Web (see Shadbolt et al. 2006) and the Web
of Things (WoT) (see Guinard et al. 2011). Given the diversity of resources in play
here, it should be clear that what makes something a part of the Web has nothing to
do with its actual nature (e.g. its material composition). Rather, what is important is
the way in which a particular resource is identified and accessed within the larger
technological infrastructure of the Internet.
Now that we have a better understanding of what the Web is, we are in a position
to specify what is meant by the notion of a ‘Web-based system’. Following on from
the aforementioned definition of the World Wide Web, we can define a Web-based
system as follows:
(Web-Based System) A Web-based system is any system in which at least
some of the constituent elements are Web resources (i.e. resources that form
part of the Web).
A Web-based system is thus a system that consists, at least in part, of one or
more Web-based resources, i.e. resources that are identified using URIs and accessed
using HTTP. This definition enables us to treat many kinds of systemic organization
as Web-based systems. In some cases, we can view Web-based systems as purely
technological systems, consisting of (e.g.) physical devices, software components
and digital encodings. At other times, we can view Web-based systems as materially
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Fig. 1 The notion of a Web-extended mind (or Web-extended cognitive system) is defined as a sub-type
of both an extended cognitive system and a Web-based system. A Web-based system is, in turn, defined as
a sub-type of an Internet-based system, while an extended cognitive system is defined as a sub-type of a
cognitive system. Note that the arrows in this diagram symbolize sub-type relationships. Given the nature
of the taxonomic relationships in play here it should be clear that a Web-extended cognitive system is also
a type of Internet-extended cognitive system
heterogeneous ensembles involving one or more human agents. It is in virtue of this
sort of conceptualization that we can now begin to creep up on the notion of a Web-
extended mind. For a Web-based system that includes one or more biological entities
is already a form of bio-technological ensemble that participates in complex forms of
(physically distributed) information processing. All that needs to happen in order for
us to recognize such systemic organizations as Web-extended cognitive systems (or
Web-extended minds) is for the biological and technological elements of the relevant
system to participate in processes that we recognize as, in some sense, cognitive in
nature. Of course, the issue of what it is that makes a process cognitive (as opposed
to non-cognitive) is something that remains a point of contention in the philosophical
community (e.g. Rowlands 2009;Adams and Aizawa 2010). In spite of this, I suggest
that for the purposes of getting a firmer grip on the notion of a Web-extended mind,
we should set such issues to one side and accept that our pre-theoretical intuitions can
serve as a reliable guide as to what it is that makes something a cognitive process.3
The result of all this is that a Web-extended mind can, for present purposes, be
defined as follows:
(Web-Extended Mind) A Web-extended mind is an extended cognitive sys-
tem whose processes supervene on a set of constituent material elements that
includes one or more Web resources.
In other words, a Web-extended mind is a systemic organization that exists as both
a Web-based system and an extended cognitive system (see Fig. 1).
3Something similar is, in fact, suggested by Clark and Chalmers (1998). When it comes to our under-
standing of what it is that makes something a cognitive process, for example, Clark (2010b) notes that
‘The argument by Clark and Chalmers assumes that we do possess some such understanding, and that
it is rooted, roughly speaking, in our implicit knowledge of the distinctive functional role of cognitive
processes in guiding intelligent behavior’ (p. 55).
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2.2 Availability
With a clearer sense as to what is meant by the notion of a Web-extended mind,
we can now turn to the issue of whether the current (or near-future) Web is able to
yield a plentiful supply of extended cognitive systems. As was mentioned above, one
way of making progress on this issue is to refer to the criteria proposed by Clark
and Chalmers (1998) (i.e. the criteria of availability, trust and accessibility). The first
of these criteria concerns the availability of the resource that serves as a source of
information. According to this criterion, one of the things that makes a bio-external
resource apt for cognitive incorporation is the fact that it is ‘reliably available’ and
‘typically invoked’. This seems to suggest that issues of portability and mobility are
relevant to cognitive extension: the more portable something is, the better its can-
didacy for cognitive incorporation. In this respect, the general thrust of technology
development would seem to speak in favor of Web-based forms of cognitive exten-
sion (see Smart in press). This is because when we look at recent developments
in mobile computing, it seems that a broad array of highly portable devices (e.g.
smartphones) are able to provide ever more convenient ways of accessing the online
environment. Although some have expressed reservations about the power dependen-
cies of these devices (see Heersmink 2012), it seems as though the current portability
of a typical smartphone—the apotheosis of mobile device design—is probably not
all that dissimilar to the notebook resource that features in the classic (Otto) thought
experiment discussed by Clark and Chalmers (1998). For this reason, we might be
inclined to see the smartphone as a device that is suitably poised, under the availabil-
ity criterion, to participate in extended nexuses of cognitively relevant information
processing.
There is, however, an important issue that comes to light when we focus our atten-
tion on portable, Internet-enabled computing devices. This concerns the way in which
a mobile device is used to gain access to some body of online information. Here,
we encounter an important difference with the Otto notebook case. In the case of
Otto’s notebook, it clearly makes sense to talk of the notebook as a container for
belief-relevant information—the encodings that Otto relies on are, we can assume,
neatly stored on the individual pages of his notebook. The mobile device, however,
does not submit to this sort of characterization. It does not, therefore, seem appropri-
ate to say that in carrying a mobile device around with us we are also transporting
the physical vehicles that realize our body of bio-external beliefs. This becomes all
too apparent in cases where wireless access to the Internet is denied. In such discon-
nected scenarios, the device is no longer able to guide our thoughts and actions in a
way that is sufficient to legitimate claims regarding states of extended (dispositional)
belief.
This seemingly trivial observation has a number of important implications for
extended mind theorizing. Firstly, note that in the mobile device case it is no longer
appropriate to talk of information being contained in a resource. This, recall, was how
the third of the trust and glue criteria—the one relating to accessibility—was pre-
sented (see above). Secondly, it should be clear that what counts in the mobile device
case is not so much the availability of the device that is used to access a body of online
information; instead, what matters is the availability of the online information itself!
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A disconnected smartphone might thus be next to useless in terms of its ability to
function as an extended mind resource, especially one that helps to bring Web-based
forms of cognitive processing into existence.
When it comes to issues of availability, therefore, what seems to be of primary
importance is not the availability of the resource that is used to mediate access to
information (the notebook or smartphone); rather, what matters is the availability of
the information itself. In the Otto case, this issue does not arise because the note-
book and its informational encodings are co-located. In the Web-extended mind case,
however, the availability of the information does matter because the mere availability
of the device is not (by itself) sufficient to secure access to a body of belief-relevant
information.4
This highlights a potential problem with the availability criterion in its current
form. In particular, the availability criterion emphasizes the availability of the phys-
ical resource (e.g. the technological device) that is used to deliver information. This
seems perfectly appropriate in the classic Otto case, since the distinction between
resource availability and information availability is of nugatory significance: the rel-
evant body of information is always stored in Otto’s notebook and thus wherever the
notebook goes the information is sure to follow. This is not the case with an Internet-
enabled device. In this case, the technological device could be readily available (and
thus meet the availability criterion); however, it could still fail to provide access to
the relevant body of online information, perhaps because its networking capabilities
have been temporarily disrupted.
The upshot of all this is that the availability criterion looks to be in need of revi-
sion. In particular, we should perhaps insist that in addition to a resource being
reliably available, it should also be suitably poised to provide access to some rel-
evant body of bio-external information. But now notice something important: once
we accept the dissociability of an extended mind resource and its informational con-
tent, the need for a separate availability criterion is itself called into question. This
is because claims about the availability of information content do not appear to buy
us anything over and above what is already established by the accessibility criterion.
The accessibility criterion, recall, already assumes that some body of information
will be available to an agent, and thus an appeal to the accessibility criterion seems
able to do much of the work that is deemed to be within the remit of the availability
criterion.
4The nature of the bio-external resource (e.g. its technological sophistication) actually makes very little
difference here. To help us see this, we can reflect on two extended mind scenarios. In the first scenario,
an agent interacts with a smartphone in order to access information that is stored locally on the device (i.e.
on the smartphone’s hard disk). In the second scenario, the same agent interacts with the same smartphone
in order to access information that is stored remotely (i.e. on the Internet). From the perspective of the
availability criterion, the first scenario is roughly equivalent to the classic Otto case: if the smartphone is
to count as part of the supervenience base for Otto’s dispositional beliefs, then it had better be the case that
the smartphone is available to Otto as and when he needs it. The same, of course, is also true in the second
scenario; however, in this case, something extra is required. Thus, in addition to the mere availability of
the smartphone, we also need to be sure that the smartphone is properly connected to the Internet. If this
is not the case, then the fact that the smartphone is available will count for nothing.
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A further reason to doubt the need for a separate availability criterion is revealed
once we direct our attention to issues of device independence. There may thus be a
variety of ways in which we are able to access online information via contemporary
digital devices. We can obviously access a particular body of online information via
a conventional Web browser while seated at a desktop computer. However, we may
also access exactly the same body of information via a data-driven smartphone app,
a wearable device or an object that exists as part of the Internet of Things (IoT)
(Miller 2015). Given the multiplicity of ways in which our access to online content
can be mediated, we can (and should) ask whether it still makes sense to talk about a
particular resource being ‘reliably available’, or even the need for it to be ‘typically
invoked’. Such ‘availability-oriented’ intuitions perhaps arise as a result of the current
philosophical preoccupation with the Otto notebook case. Inasmuch as this is true, it
seems as though philosophical progress in this area may have been somewhat stymied
by the understandable enthusiasm and interest that has been generated by the Otto
thought experiment. This, I suggest, is one reason why it helps to direct our attention
to the possibility of Internet-extended cognition. By considering cases of Internet-
extended cognition, we are able to reveal a range of issues that would otherwise be
hard to discern and thus likely to escape philosophical scrutiny.
2.3 Trust
The trust criterion has turned out to be one of the more problematic criteria con-
fronting the Web-extended mind hypothesis (Smart in press; 2012). Clark, for
example, suggests that the Internet is an unlikely candidate for cognitive incorpora-
tion on the grounds that it falls foul of the trust criterion. In particular, Clark suggests
that access to Google (even a form of mobile access) is not sufficient for cognitive
extension on the grounds that Google-derived information is subject to a form of crit-
ical evaluation (see Clark 2010b, p. 46). Clark is, of course, talking about a particular
kind of Internet access here. It is highly unlikely, I suspect, that he would seek to
champion the view that absolutely no form of contact with the Internet could ever
(at any time) count as a form of extended cognizing. In fact, what seems to be fuel-
ing Clark’s unease with the Internet is tied to the fact that we often have very little
control over what appears online. Given that much of the information we encounter
on the Web is generated by other agencies, it seems reasonable to assume that such
information is treated in a manner that is profoundly different to that encountered in
the case of internally situated (i.e. brain-based) information flows. Based on this sort
of disparity, it is perhaps hard to see external, Internet-involving informational cir-
cuits as functioning in roughly the same sort of way as those that exist solely in the
intra-cranial domain.
In evaluating the extent to which the trust criterion poses a legitimate threat
to the possibility of Web-based forms of cognitive extension, there are, I suggest,
a couple of issues that should be the focus of future scientific and philosophical
attention. Firstly, we should ask to what extent contemporary Web users really do
approach online information in the sort of way that is deemed inimical to extended
mind accounts. Do Web users really subject online information to the sort of critical
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evaluation that would undermine their status as Web-extended cognizers? Although
it might seem appropriate, on epistemic grounds, to be somewhat circumspect about
what appears on the Web, why should we assume, in the absence of empirical confir-
mation, that Web users really do behave in this sort of epistemically optimal manner?
Secondly, we should ask what is really implied by the trust criterion. This is impor-
tant, because a casual reading of the trust criterion might lead one to the conclusion
that any form of evaluation and endorsement is off limits. In fact, in his analysis of the
extended mind thesis, Michaelian (2012a) questions the extent to which we should
see bio-external forms of memory as a genuine form of memory given a particu-
lar reading of the trust criterion. One reason for scepticism about extended memory,
Michaelian argues, is based on the idea that no form of endorsement of bio-external
information is permitted in the case of extended minds. This, Michaelian suggests,
undermines the very notion of extended/external memory, since biologically based
forms of mnemonic retrieval are, in fact, subject to evaluative assessment:
...due to the constructive character of encoding, consolidation, and retrieval,
[mnemonic] records are not endorsed automatically upon retrieval–
metamemory processes rather intervene to determine [the] endorse-
ment/rejection of retrieved records. (Michaelian 2012a, p. 1156)
This is where it pays to subject the trust criterion itself to critical evaluation and
careful scrutiny. For the idea that no form of critical assessment is permitted in
the case of extended cognition is not, I think, what Clark is attempting to guard
against. This becomes clear when we consider what Clark has to say in respect of the
epistemic evaluation of notebook information in the Otto case:
But the information in the notebook, when the notebook is invoked in a bout of
active problem-solving, is subject to all the automatic sub-personal checks and
balances that apply to information retrieved from bio-memory. These checks
and balances...in no way require that the notebook be encountered, or even be
poised to be encountered, by the agent as an object of active epistemic scrutiny.
(Clark 2015, p. 3770) [emphasis added]
Here, we can see that Clark accepts the possibility that some form of evaluative
assessment is entirely permissible in the case of extended cognitive systems. What
he is trying to guard against is the idea that these forms of evaluative assessment are
radically different to those that operate in the case of brain-based information flows.
When it comes to issues of trust, therefore, it is important to determine whether
(and to what extent) individuals subject online information to forms of vetting and
validation that are distinct from those that operate in the internal, neural realm. This,
it seems to me, is as an issue that requires as much empirical attention as it does
philosophical analysis. Indeed, I suspect that the issue is not one that can resolved
solely from the comfort of the philosophical armchair.
2.4 Accessibility
Finally, how does the Web fare when it comes to issues of accessibility—the third of
Clark’s (2010b) trust and glue criteria? There are, it seems, conflicting views here.
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Fig. 2 Two screenshots showing information relating to Charles Darwin’s date of birth. a The Wikipedia
entry for Charles Darwin, as viewed on an Apple iPad device. b The use of Apple’s Siri agent to access
the relevant item of information
A somewhat negative view is expressed by Smart (2012). He claims that the nature
of the informational contact we have with conventional HTML Web pages is (for
the most part) inadequate with respect to issues of accessibility. One reason for this,
he claims, is that relevant information is often embedded in much larger bodies of
online content. The result is that we often have to invest considerable time and effort
retrieving relevant information.
A more upbeat assessment of informational accessibility on the Web is provided
by Ludwig (2015). He suggests that even in the case of conventional Web pages—
the sort of resources targeted by Smart (2012)—we are still able to enjoy the sort of
access that motivates claims regarding extended realization bases for states of (e.g.)
dispositional belief. Ludwig, in fact, relies on this to substantiate claims regarding
the potential explosion of beliefs and knowledge that occur as a result of our typi-
cal (browser-based) forms of contact with the online realm (see Section 5). Ludwig
(2015) thus suggests that if we want to ‘know’ the birth date of Charles Darwin,
we can simply access the relevant Wikipedia article and find the required piece of
information conveniently located at the top of the page. It is thus the location of
the relevant information item—the fact that the birth date appears at the top of the
page, as opposed to being deeply embedded within the target article—that determines
whether it is a candidate for cognitive incorporation (see Fig. 2a).
Unfortunately, I do not think that Ludwig’s claims about accessibility can be made
to work. It seems to me that the ‘location’ of an item of information within a particular
resource is liable to change as the focal resource is subject to communal edits, or as
the resource is viewed on different devices.5 It is this locational lability, I suggest,
that undermines Ludwig’s attempt to defuse claims regarding the (in)accessibility of
online information.
5Consider, for example, how the same Wikipedia article might be displayed on a smartwatch versus a
conventional desktop computer.
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All, however, is not lost; for a recent focus of research attention in the WAIS
community concerns the development of new representational schemes for the Web.
There has thus been a recent attempt to move towards a more data-centric vision of
the Web, one which emphasizes the role of the Web in providing access to globally
distributed bodies of machine-readable information (Wood et al. 2014; Bizer 2009;
Heath and Bizer 2011). Crucially, the kinds of representational formats that feature
as part of this ongoing research and development effort are ones that promise to
transform the nature of our informational (and perhaps cognitive) contact with the
Web. Linked data resources are thus able to serve as a back-end repository for all-
manner of data-driven apps and services, many of which can be tailored to provide
easy access to specific bodies of information content. The use of online data assets
also helps to free us of the otherwise restrictive notion that all cognitively relevant
information in the online realm needs to appear in textual form. Data-oriented repre-
sentations thus enable information (sometimes the same information) to be presented
in a variety of different ways, for example, as verbal prompts, graphical cues, and
augmented reality overlays (see Smart 2014).
The Web of Data not only promises to reshape our traditional approach to access-
ing online information, it also opens up a wealth of opportunities to develop various
forms of ‘assistive intelligence’. In order to help us see this, think about the way
in which a body of semantically enriched online data (see Shadbolt et al. 2006)
might be exploited by a speech-enabled intelligent assistant, such as Apple’s Siri or
Microsoft’s Cortana. Suppose that the body of data being exploited relates to the birth
dates of significant historical figures. Given that the data is both machine-readable
and annotated in ways that supports various forms of (semantically enabled) search
and reasoning, it now becomes possible to initiate new forms of epistemically potent
interaction with a conversationally enabled digital companion. You can thus ask Siri
questions, such as ‘When was Charles Darwin born?’ Almost immediately, you will
hear the response: ‘Charles Darwin was born the 12th February 1809’ (see Fig. 2b).
This, at least, is the response that was provided by my own Siri-enabled device at the
time of writing.
As a further example of this sort of assistive intelligence, imagine that you are
walking in the forest with a friend. As usual, you are equipped with a portable
smartphone device. In addition, you are wearing a head-mounted augmented real-
ity display device (a future version of Google Glass perhaps) that is able to interact
wirelessly with your smartphone and present Internet-accessible information directly
within your field of view. Suddenly, you and your friend come across an odd look-
ing tree, one that appears different from all the rest. ‘Do you know what kind of
tree that is?’, asks your friend. ‘Sure’, you say. You hold up one of the leaves from
the tree in front of the camera embedded in your headset. The headset transfers the
image to your smartphone, which performs some preliminary image analysis and
identifies the object as a leaf. The phone then invokes the services of a tree classifi-
cation app,6 which analyzes the image, extracts some relevant features and acquires
6The envisaged capabilities, in this case, are somewhat similar to those of existing smartphone apps, such
as Leafsnap (Kumar et al. 2012) and ApLeaf (Zhao et al. 2015).
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contextual information relating to (e.g.) your geographic location. The app then pro-
ceeds to query an online linked data repository containing information about the
relationship between tree species and their associated characteristics. The name of
the tree species is subsequently returned to the app and ultimately transferred to your
headset. The headset, in turn, displays the (correct) name of the tree species directly
within your field of view.
An important question to ask at this point is whether it is appropriate to conclude
that you really do ‘know’ the relevant tree species, perhaps even before you recruited
the services of your arsenal of ambient technological aids. Do you qualify as an arbo-
real classification expert, despite the fact that quite a lot of the relevant processing
seems to be taking place beyond the borders of the biological domain? Perhaps, as
is often suggested in cases of extended cognition, the processing loop that travels
through your smartphone and into the online environment should be considered as
functionally equivalent to the brain-based neural circuits that would otherwise enable
you to retrieve information from bio-memory. Inasmuch as this is indeed the case,
why should we seek to cast aspersions on your arboreal expertise? If online informa-
tion is poised to influence your thoughts and actions in roughly the same sort of way
as information retrieved from bio-memory, then what is the basis for claiming that
cases of brain-based information retrieval are indicative of a particular kind of cogni-
tive competence, whereas the retrieval capabilities of the headset-phone-app-Internet
ensemble fail to hit the (cognitive) mark?
We can now see, in the wake of these two examples, how the transition from a
document-centred Web (populated by conventional Web pages) to a data-centred Web
(populated by a rich and interconnected array of linked data assets) could transform
the kinds of cognitive contact that we are able to establish with the online environ-
ment. The general moral here is that we should not confuse the shortcomings of
one particular form of Web access with the properties of all forms of Web access.
Given the popularity and ubiquity of conventional (HTML) Web pages, it is easy
for philosophers to be misled into thinking that such resources are the only kinds
of resources that are relevant to issues of cognitive incorporation. The technological
remit of the Web, however, is much broader than conventional Web pages, and such
resources certainly do not exhaust the range of interactive opportunities that are likely
to be available to the human user community (both now and in the future). When it
comes to the accessibility of online information, then, there is a pressing need for
philosophers to broaden the scope of their current analytic efforts.
3 Over-Extended Minds?
As we saw in the previous section, the nature of our relationship with the contempo-
rary Internet seems to allow for the possibility of various forms of Internet-extended
cognition. This positive assessment is further reinforced, some have claimed, once
we consider the general trajectory of technology development (see Smart in press). In
fact, the nature of emerging digital technologies may mean that the Internet-extended
mind is able to serve as a better example of cognitive extension than the original
Otto case. Smart (in press), for instance, suggests that an online economy of machine
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reasoners and semantically enriched content is able to support the kind of informa-
tional updating and inferential coherence that is sometimes deemed to be of crucial
relevance to the doxastic status of extended cognizers (Weiskopf 2008; Wikforss
2014). This is not to say, however, that Internet-based forms of cognitive extension
are entirely unproblematic, or even that they do not give rise to issues that might be
seen as inimical to the very idea of extended cognition. In what follows, I attempt to
identify a number of areas where a consideration of Internet-based forms of cognitive
extension might serve as a source of grist for the sceptic’s mill.
3.1 Network-Extended Cognitive Bloat
One of the problems afflicting extended mind accounts is the notorious problem of
‘cognitive bloat’ (Allen-Hermanson 2013). Cognitive bloat refers to an unwelcome
expansion in the sorts of things that count as part of the machinery of the mind. As is
noted by Allen-Hermanson (2013):
While EC’s [extended cognition’s] advocates wish to ‘supersize’ the mind, they
have no desire to overextend the boundaries. All sorts of things that are not
part of one’s mental vehicle play a causal-explanatory role when it comes to
supplying information. If a notebook counts as part of one’s mind, then why
not the yellow pages, the internet, or even parts of the natural world that supply
information and support cognition? (Allen-Hermanson 2013, p. 792)
Issues of cognitive bloat typically arise in respect of particular kinds of resources,
such as the much maligned Encyclopaedia Britannica. The nature of these resources
is deemed to be so at odds with our intuitions as to what can serve as a genuine
realizer of cognitive states and processes that they are seen to lead to a very reductio
of the idea that the mind extends beyond the biological borders of the individual.
In the case of Internet-based forms of cognitive extension, it is possible to iden-
tify a somewhat different kind of cognitive bloat. This kind of bloat stems from the
fact that the Internet is a global information and communication network that sup-
ports highly distributed forms of information access, data representation and service
invocation. In applying notions of cognitive extension to the Internet, we thus come
face-to-face with the idea that the vehicles of cognition might be situated some physi-
cal distance from the individual whose cognitive apparatus is supposedly extended. In
the conventional case of Otto and his notebook, this sort of distance-related issue does
not arise. This is because Otto’s notebook and all its doxastically relevant encodings
are located within the immediate vicinity of Otto. But now imagine a technologically
upgraded version of the Otto case, where the notebook is replaced with a smartphone
and the contents of Otto’s notebook are stored in the cloud, perhaps in an Internet-
accessible database that is located on the other side of the planet. In this case, our
active externalist intuitions are arguably irritated by issues of physical distance and
distribution. Should we really accept the claim that a resource located on the other
side of the planet is able to function as part of an extended cognitive circuit? When
we think about extended cognitive systems, it is natural to think of a nexus of mate-
rially heterogeneous resources that are linked together by cognitively relevant forms
of causal commerce (see Smart et al. 2010). But just how far should we allow that
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network to extend beyond the biological borders of the individual? Providing one
accepts that Otto and his notebook do indeed count as a bona fide case of cognitive
extension, then the appeal to more technologically sophisticated scenarios (e.g. those
involving a neurologically normal individual equipped with a smartphone) may look
to be largely innocuous. However, the case of Internet-extended cognition gives rise
to issues that were not apparent in the original Otto case, and some of these issues
may work to offend the intuitions of even the most ardent advocate of active exter-
nalism. In the current case, we have to ask ourselves at what point (if any) should we
seek to draw a line regarding the spatial extent of the network that realizes a putative
case of extended cognizing. The local interactions between an individual and their
smartphone do not seem to pose much of a problem here. But what about the larger
representational and computational nexus that enables and supports that local inter-
action? Should a set of remotely located servers, circuit boards and databases also
count as candidates for cognitive incorporation, in addition to the more proximally
situated smartphone device?
The main point, then, is that a consideration of Internet-extended cognition seems
to lead to a concern about the physical (spatial) distribution of the bio-external
resources that feature as part of an extended cognitive system. This issue is not
so readily apparent in the more conventional cases of cognitive extension (e.g. the
Otto notebook case), because many of those cases do not feature the involvement of
resources that are physically remote. When we focus on a paper-based notebook as an
extended mind resource, for example, issues of physical (spatial) distribution do not
arise. This is because when the notebook is physically remote, it is no longer a candi-
date for cognitive incorporation on account of the fact that it is no longer accessible
to the relevant individual. It is, in fact, only when the notebook is within ‘touching
distance’ of the individual that we deem the notebook to be of (potential) constitutive
relevance to the individual’s cognitive economy.
Perhaps one way of making progress on this issue is to revisit a thought experiment
that was originally proposed by Daniel Dennett (1981) in a paper titled ‘Where am
I?’. Let us therefore imagine a situation in which some part of an individual’s brain—
their hippocampus, let’s say—was anatomically separated from the rest of their brain
and transported to the other side of the planet. Now let us assume that the isolated
hippocampus was suspended in a nutritive jar of fluids in order to keep it ‘alive’,
and that it was re-connected to the rest of the individual’s brain using a combination
of neural interfacing techniques and Internet-mediated forms of information transfer.
In this case, the Internet serves as part of the physical network that allows for the
bidirectional flow of signals between the physically remote hippocampus and the rest
of the individual’s biological brain. Although this case is entirely fictional, we can
use it to pump our intuitions concerning the role of physical distance in undermining
claims for cognitive extension. We can thus ask whether we would be content to
view the remotely located hippocampus as part of the physical machinery of the
mind if it was seen to support the expression of intelligent behavior in more-or-less
the same sort of way as it did when it was located inside the skull. If we are able
to answer in the affirmative here, it is unclear why issues of physical distance, by
themselves at least, should count against the possibility of Internet-based forms of
cognitive extension.
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3.2 Local vs. Remote Resources
One way of responding to worries about network-extended cognitive bloat is to limit
the set of non-standard physical realizers to those that are located in the immediate
vicinity of the biological individual. Accordingly, we might insist that in order for
something to count as a candidate for cognitive incorporation it needs to be in direct
contact with the sensorimotor surfaces of the human individual. Anything that fails
to meet this criterion, we might insist, should not count as part of the realization base
for an individual’s cognitive states and processes. In this case, an Internet-enabled
smartphone would still count as a candidate object for cognitive extension, as would
the information that is provided by the smartphone (following its retrieval from some
remotely located database or website). What would not count as a candidate for
cognitive incorporation, however, are those elements that are distal to the sensori-
motor surfaces of the biological agent, namely, the remotely located database and its
associated informational content.
As a means of tackling issues of network-extended cognitive bloat, this sort of
‘spatial proximity criterion’ looks to be highly effective. In addition, the criterion
looks to be rather innocent from an extended mind perspective. In particular, by
embracing the criterion, we are not ruling out the possibility of cognitive exten-
sion; we are merely stating that there should be some form of direct contact between
the biological individual and the set of resources that function as the constitutive
elements of an extended cognitive circuit.
Unfortunately, from the perspective of Internet-based forms of cognitive exten-
sion, the spatial proximity criterion is far from innocent. In fact, inasmuch as we
accept the criterion, then the prospects for perhaps any form of Internet-based cog-
nitive extension starts to look a little bleak. This is because by limiting the reach of
the extended mind to those regions of the physical environment that are in more-
or-less direct contact with the sensorimotor surfaces of the biological individual, we
rule out the possibility of including online, Internet-accessible resources within an
extended cognitive organization. In order to help us see this, recall the earlier discus-
sion regarding Web-extended minds and Web-based systems (see Section 2.1). Recall
that as part of that discussion we encountered the claim that what makes something a
Web-extended mind is the fact that it can be regarded as a specific form of Web-based
(cognitive) system; i.e. a system that includes one or more Web-accessible resources
(where the notion of a Web-accessible resource is bound up with the use of Internet
application protocols and resource identification schemes). This definition provides,
I suggest, a reasonable guide as to what counts as a Web-extended mind. But note
that once we limit our attention to those resources that are located in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the biological body, it is by no means clear that it still makes sense
to talk of extended cognitive circuits as ones that include Web-based resources. Cru-
cially, the nature of an individual’s informational contact with an Internet-enabled
device (a smartphone, let us say) is mediated primarily by their tactile, visual,
auditory and motor output systems. But in establishing contact with the smart-
phone, these biologically based sensor and effector systems do not establish any
form of direct contact with a Web resource (i.e. they do not feature the use of HTTP
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mechanisms and URI naming schemes). An individual’s immediate (sensorimotor)
contact with the smartphone is, as a result, not one that can be glossed in Web-related
terms—the resources in question are not sensu stricto Web resources. Clearly, in the
process of retrieving information from the Web and presenting it to an agent via a
display screen, the smartphone itself is required to engage in a form of interactive
engagement with the Web, and this may very well warrant talk of the smartphone as
(at least temporarily) existing as a constituent element of a Web-based system. How-
ever, it is by no means clear that it still makes sense to see the biological individual as
a component of that system. Instead, what we seem to have here are two systems that
intersect in the region of an Internet-enabled device (see Fig. 3). One of those sys-
tems is (on occasion) an extended cognitive system; the other system is (on occasion)
a Web-based system. But it does not seem appropriate, under the spatial proximity
criterion, to see the extended cognitive system as itself a form of Web-based system.
There is, in other words, no reason to see Web resources as an intrinsic part of the
causally active physical fabric that realizes an individual’s cognitive states and pro-
cesses. It is in this sense that the spatial proximity criterion is, I suggest, inimical to
the idea of Web-extended (or, more generally, Internet-extended) cognition.
In opposition to this rather dismal conclusion, proponents of the extended mind
might want to point out that our sense as to what should count as the sensorimotor
surface of a cognitive agent is itself something that is challenged by the notion of
cognitive extension. If we are indeed entities that are subject to various forms of cog-
nitive and bodily extension (see Clark 2007), why should we continue to privilege
the biological borders of the individual in staking out what counts as a constituent
element of a cognitive system: if my body and mind are extended by the addi-
tion of some kind of technological prosthesis, such as an iPhone, why should my
Web-Based System 
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Fig. 3 The imposition of the spatial proximity criterion means that the boundaries of an extended cog-
nitive system no longer reach out to include a set of Web-based resources. The result is that we have
two systems—a Web-based system and an extended cognitive system—however, the extended cogni-
tive system no longer counts as a Web-based system. This is sufficient, it seems, to rule out claims of
Web-extended cognition under the terms of the definition proposed in Section 2.1
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sensorimotor surfaces not extend to encompass the capabilities of the technological
prosthesis itself? Why, in other words, should the interactive capabilities of the (cog-
nitively integrated) iPhone not be counted as part of the sensorimotor paraphernalia
that I, as a cognitive agent, rely on to help me navigate the cognitive and epistemic
terrain of the online, digital world? As a means of further pressing this case, consider
again the hippocampus-in-a-vat scenario (see Section 3.1). There is clearly a sense in
which the remotely situated hippocampus counts as an Internet-accessible resource.
It is thus a resource that engages in rich bidirectional forms of Internet-mediated
communication with the rest of the biological brain, and such bidirectional commu-
nication occurs as a result of (let us suppose) the use of a specific (perhaps bespoke)
Internet application protocol. There is also a sense in which the nature of an agent’s
contact with the remote hippocampus is at least somewhat indirect. There are, we
may assume, multiple kinds of switching, gating, routing, signalling and intermedi-
ate computational processing that occur every time the hippocampus is called on to
service the representational and computational needs of the rest of the (brain-based)
cognitive economy. The critical question that gets raised by all this is the following:
why, if we are happy to accept that the hippocampus-in-a-vat counts as part of the
machinery of the mind, should we discount Internet-accessible resources as candi-
dates for cognitive incorporation solely on the basis that they are not within ‘direct’
reach of our biologically based sensorimotor systems?
3.3 Cognitive Cabling
Another line of attack for those who are sceptical of claims regarding Internet-
extended cognition concerns the role played by physical cabling in supporting the
flow of information across the Internet. Surely, a sceptic might insist, we do not want
to allow that a lengthy stretch of cable should count as part of the machinery of the
mind simply because we happen to rely on the information contained in a physically
remote Web resource. If we accept the idea that cabling should count as part of the
physical machinery of the mind, won’t we risk committing ourselves to the seem-
ingly ludicrous idea that a trans-oceanic telecommunications cable is, at some time
or another, a constituent element of a vastly (over-)extended cognitive system?
Echoes of this sort of worry can be found in the mainstream extended mind liter-
ature. In their critique of the notion of extended cognition, for instance, Adams and
Aizawa (2008) suggest that the mere transfer of information (from one location to
another) is not sufficient to warrant claims regarding cognitive incorporation. This,
they suggest, applies as much to the inner, neural realm as it does to the world beyond
the organismic boundary. On their view, the corpus callosum should be regarded as
a passive carrier of information—a ‘mere bus’— rather than as some active element
of the neural information processing economy (see Adams and Aizawa 2008, p. 17).
This kind of information-transfer-related worry is, it should be clear, simply the neu-
rological counterpart to the worry about Internet cabling. Such cabling, it might be
said, undoubtedly plays an important role in supporting the run-time realization of
cognitively relevant information processing routines, but it does not—at least to any
significant extent—participate in the active manipulation and transformation (i.e. the
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processing) of such information. As a result, Internet cabling should not count as part
of the realization base for human mental states and processes.7
By way of responding to this worry, we might want to question the extent to which
we can actually disentangle issues of ‘mere information transfer’ from issues con-
cerning the mechanistic realization of cognitive processes. In fact, as is noted by
Clark (2010c), it is far from clear that we can perform the required separation; neither
is it clear that we even make sense of the idea that the pattern of information flow,
as enabled by some set of connective elements (e.g. cabling), is utterly irrelevant to
the project of understanding the operation of an information processing system. In
the case of the biological brain, for example, the nodal elements (i.e. neurons) are
elements that participate in both the processing of information as well as the trans-
fer of information to remote anatomical regions via their axonal projections. Should
we thereby insist that only the cell body of the neuron should count as cognitively
relevant, while all the axonal elements are to be excluded? This, to my mind, is non-
sensical. When it comes to the biological brain, as well as an array of other networked
systems, what really matters to information processing is the pattern of information
flow and influence that is enabled by the structural organization of the system. In
other words, it is the time-variant topological structure of the information processing
network that plays a crucial role in enabling us to understand the properties (cog-
nitive or otherwise) of the larger systemic organization.8 Given that this structure is
determined by the set of physical linkages that connect one element to another, why
should we fail to appreciate the cognitive significance of the connective elements
when the focal system is recognized as a bona fide cognitive system. To do so is
surely to overlook an important body of scientific work that emphasizes the role of
network structure in enabling us to attain an explanatorily potent grip on the behavior
of a broad array of materially diverse complex systems (Buchanan 2002; Barabasi
2002; Baronchelli et al. 2013).
4 Intimate Connections
Perhaps one of most distinctive features of the Internet is its connectivity—the fact
that it permits almost anyone to share and access information, pretty much from
anywhere in the world. This feature marks the Internet out for special consideration
when it comes to issues of extended cognition. This is because the Internet forces us
to consider cases in which the supervenience base for one individual’s mental states
and processes could be seen to overlap with that of another individual. To help us
gain a better understanding of this idea, consider a situation in which two or more
7See Giere (2012, p. 201) for similar views about the inadequacy of information transfer in the case of
distributed cognition.
8When it comes to issues of collective cognitive processing, for example, the structure of the communi-
cation network that mediates the flow of information between individual problem-solving agents is often
deemed to be of crucial explanatory relevance in accounting for particular performance outcomes (e.g.
Kearns 2012).
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Fig. 4 The notion of conjoined minds refers to a situation in which some online, Internet-accessible
resource serves as a common element of two (or more) Internet-extended cognitive systems (in this case,
Web-extended minds)
individuals access the same piece of online information as part of some episode of
extended cognitive processing. Imagine, for the sake argument, that two individuals
use their smartphones to retrieve information about the location of the Museum of
Modern Art. If we restrict our attention to just one of these individuals, the situation
appears to resemble the classic case of Otto and his notebook. Indeed, inasmuch as
we accept the basic idea of Web-based forms of cognitive extension (see Section 2),
then it seems appropriate to see the online resource as part of the mechanistic super-
venience base for the focal individual’s dispositional beliefs about the museum’s
location. But now notice what happens when we broaden our analytic gaze to include
the second individual. In this case, it becomes apparent that the online resource is a
common element in an extended material nexus that comprises the realization base
for both of the individuals’ location-related dispositional beliefs. In other words, in
the case of Internet-extended cognition, we encounter a state-of-affairs in which the
(extended) mind of one individual could (on occasion) overlap with the (extended)
mind of another individual. In grappling with the implications of Internet-extended
cognition, therefore, we have to confront the curious case of what might be called
‘conjoined minds’—the idea that a bio-external resource could form part of the cog-
nitively relevant physical machinery that underlies the mental states and processes of
multiple human individuals (see Fig. 4).
The topic of conjoined minds has seldom been discussed in the philosophical liter-
ature.9 One exception is a paper by Halpin et al. (2010). In regard to Web-accessible
content, for example, Halpin et al. hint at the possibility of shared supervenience
bases for cognitive states and processes:
9This lack of attention is unfortunate, since the topic of conjoined minds gives rise to a number of impor-
tant issues. It seems, for example, that the idea of shared supervenience bases for mental states and
processes provides a form of inter-individual cognitive contact that is just as profound and important as
that evoked by recent work on brain-to-brain interfaces (Pais-Vieira et al. 2015; Grau et al. 2014).
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Perhaps external representations on the Web, when integrated appropriately into
the processes that govern an agents [sic] behaviour, may count as parts of that
agents [sic] cognitive architecture. But now assume that multiple individuals
are able to access the same external representation...Here, it seems, more than
one person may deserve cognitive credit for, and have cognitive ownership of,
a representation that augments their own individual intelligence. (Halpin et al.
2010, p. 2)
One reason why the Internet is of particular importance and relevance here relates
to the way in which it affords large-scale social access to specific online resources.
It is therefore relatively easy to imagine a state-of-affairs in which multiple individ-
uals are accessing the same body of information at the same time, albeit (perhaps)
for different cognitive purposes. This does not mean that conjoined minds are only
to be found in situations that involve the Internet—it is, I suppose, possible that con-
joined minds could emerge in other kinds of socio-technical context. Nevertheless,
the ease with which we are able to entertain the possibility of conjoined minds in
an Internet context, as well as the potential scale of such minds,10 helps to highlight
the philosophical importance of the Internet when it comes to issues of cognitive
extension.
5 Extended Knowledge
The application of extended mind theorizing to the Internet has potentially profound
implications for our status as epistemic agents. If we accept, for example, that online
information can play the same sort of functional role as that served by the information
in Otto’s notebook, then it seems that the Internet-extended cognizer could be subject
to a significant expansion in their body of dispositional beliefs. Indeed, assuming that
such dispositional beliefs are true, we may even wonder whether this form of doxastic
expansion is sufficient to transform the Internet-extended cognizer into something of
a ‘super-sized knower’. The possibility of Internet-extended cognition thus appears
to open the door to a profound form of epistemic transformation, one in which the
limits of what we know are only bounded by what the Internet makes available (see
Smart 2012).
This sort of reasoning forms the basis for a number of recent claims regarding the
epistemic impact of the Internet (Ludwig 2015; Bjerring and Pedersen 2014). Ludwig
(2015), for example, argues that in the wake of Internet-based forms of cognitive
extension, we should anticipate a profound transformation of our doxastic potential.
In particular, he anticipates ‘an explosion of dispositional beliefs and knowledge that
is caused by digital information resources such as Wikipedia or Google’ (p. 355).
Similar views are expressed by Bjerring and Pedersen (2014). They argue that the
Web enables us to enjoy various forms of ‘restricted epistemic omniscience’, wherein
we have more-or-less ‘complete knowledge about a particular, fairly specific subject
matter’ (p. 25).
10Consider, for example, the number of people that might rely on a common body of online information,
such as that provided by Wikipedia.
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Are such claims to be believed? Do extended cognizers really give rise to extended
knowers? And, if so, what impact does this have on the nature of our individual and
collective epistemic capabilities?
In answering these questions, it seems appropriate to turn to our attention to the
epistemological literature. A popular way of thinking about knowledge within con-
temporary epistemology is to emphasize the role played by cognitive abilities in
determining the truth status of an individual’s beliefs. An agent S can thus be said to
know that p if and only if S believes that p and the truth of S’s belief that p is due to
the exercise of cognitive abilities that are ascribed to S. This sort of epistemological
position is known as virtue reliabilism (Greco 2007; 2012), and it forms part of a
more general movement in contemporary epistemology that goes under the heading
of virtue epistemology (Greco and Turri 2012).
Relative to the virtue theoretic conception of knowledge, there have been a num-
ber of attempts to advance our understanding of what has been dubbed ‘extended
knowledge’ (Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014a; Smart in press). This is a form of
knowledge that is (in some way) tied to the operation of extended cognitive rou-
tines. There are, however, a number of different interpretations as to what is meant
by the term ‘extended knowledge’. One seemingly straightforward option here is to
see extended knowledge as a specific form of extended belief. In other words, in
making sense of the notion of extended knowledge, we can take the classic case
of extended supervenience bases for states of dispositional believing (see Clark and
Chalmers 1998) and apply this to the case of beliefs that (qua virtue epistemologi-
cal accounts) qualify as knowledge. Extended knowledge, on this view, is a specific
form of materially extended dispositional belief (i.e. a mental state whose realization
base extends beyond the traditional organismic boundaries of the biological indi-
vidual). This, I assume, is the sort of view that is countenanced by both Ludwig
(2015) and Bjerring and Pedersen (2014) as part of their attempt to make the case for
Internet-enabled forms of epistemic expansion.
There is, however, a problem with this particular view of extended knowledge.
Recall that from the perspective of virtue reliabilism, a belief should only count as
knowledge if the cognitive abilities of the believer (i.e. the agent that holds the belief)
are deemed to play an explanatorily significant role in determining the truth status
of the belief. Unfortunately, this is a condition that is utterly inappropriate for the
purposes of evaluating the epistemic standing of the Internet-extended cognizer. The
reason for this is that the agent that is the subject of the extended belief state (i.e. the
candidate knower) is unlikely to be the agent whose abilities (cognitive or otherwise)
contributed to the formation of the dispositional belief in question. In most of the
cases that Ludwig and others refer to (e.g. cases where an agent is interacting with
Google or Wikipedia), there seems to be little reason to think that the subject of
the extended belief state plays any (significant) role in the creation of the material
resources upon which their dispositional beliefs supervene. As such, it is difficult to
see how it is that their cognitive abilities could have played any role in determining
why it is that their states of extended dispositional believing are able to track the
truth. In other words, it looks highly unlikely that Internet-extended cognizers can be
deemed to be extended knowers, at least from the perspective of a virtue-theoretic
account of knowledge.
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One response to all this is to claim that the focus of the preceding argument is
simply misplaced. Rather than focus on the processes that lead to the formation of a
dispositional belief, perhaps it is better to shift our attention to the processes that are
in evidence when some body of extra-organismic information is actually exploited by
an extended cognitive agent. This seems to be a reasonable strategy; since once we
switch our attention to the run-time processes of information retrieval—to the point
at which an agent accesses some body of online information—things start to look
a lot more positive from the perspective of virtue-theoretic epistemic evaluation. At
the very least, we do, in this situation, seem to confront a state-of-affairs in which
an agent’s cognitive abilities could be said to be relevant to the truth (or falsity) of
the beliefs that they are deemed to hold. In particular, it seems reasonable to suppose
that the exercise of an agent’s cognitive abilities are relevant to the appropriate selec-
tion and endorsement of particular bodies of bio-external information (Michaelian
2012b). In view of this, we can surely accept that the Internet-using agent believes
the truth as a result of the exercise of their cognitive abilities. When it comes to the
much vaunted explosion of knowledge associated with the Internet-extended cog-
nizer, perhaps we finally have a means of bridging the apparent gap between extended
cognition and extended knowledge.
Unfortunately, however, I do not think things are quite so straightforward. The first
thing to note is that in switching our attention away from the processes associated
with the formation of dispositional beliefs, we have also moved away from the
idea of materially heterogeneous supervenience bases for states of extended belief.
In fact, when we focus our attention on the point at which online information is
accessed by an agent, it seems that we are no longer talking about dispositional
beliefs at all. Instead, it seems much more appropriate to see the processes of inter-
est as leading to the formation of non-dispositional (or occurrent) belief states.
There is no reason, to my mind, why we should regard such occurrent beliefs as
extended. Rather, it seems that the beliefs of interest are ones that are realized by
forces and factors that are wholly internal to the biological agent. There does not,
in other words, seem to be a compelling reason to see the ‘run-time’ retrieval of
online information as leading to the formation of extended beliefs (and thus extended
knowledge).
All of this serves to draw attention to some of the complexities associated with
the notion of extended knowledge. It also serves to highlight some of the problems
confronting claims about the epistemological significance of the Internet (Ludwig
2015; Bjerring and Pedersen 2014). Although it is perhaps natural to assume that
Internet-extended cognizers will give rise to Internet-extended knowers, things look
a lot more complicated when we attempt to situate claims of extended knowledge
within the theoretical frameworks of contemporary epistemology. None of this, of
course, should detract from the idea that the Internet expands our epistemic power
and potential by serving as an extended cognitive resource. As should be clear from
the discussion in Section 2, I tend to think that there are indeed situations where the
Internet does lead to a significant expansion in our epistemic capabilities—recall,
for example, the case of tree species identification in Section 2.4. To my mind, one
of the focus areas for future philosophical work in this area is to develop a better
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understanding of how to integrate active externalism with (e.g.) virtue theoretic con-
ceptions of knowledge. We should then seek to apply this theoretical synthesis to the
specific case of Internet-extended cognition.
6 Socially Extended Cognition
For the most part, philosophical treatments of extended cognition tend to limit their
scope to systems that involve bio-technological forms of bonding. Another form of
cognitive extension occurs, however, in relation to the social environment. In this
case, the main focus of attention relates to whether the elements of the social envi-
ronment (e.g. other human agents) are of constitutive relevance to the realization of
an individual’s cognitive processing routines.
There is, of course, little doubt that the social environment plays an impor-
tant role in shaping our cognitive performances. Consider, for example, the way in
which our mnemonic capabilities are often altered as a result of our interactions
and engagements with other agents. In the effort to recall the details of some past
event, for example, we may engage in a process of collaborative recall, whereby
recollective success is mediated by an iterative process of cross-cueing (see Sutton
et al. 2010). Similarly, when it comes to the mnemonic encoding of information,
our conversational exchanges with others may help to support a form of socially
mediated elaborative rehearsal concerning ‘significant’ events and experiences (see
Smart 2010).11
In the context of debates about the extended mind, the role of the social environ-
ment in shaping and supporting our cognitive performances helps to bolster claims
regarding socially extended cognition (e.g. Tollefsen 2006). This is a form of cogni-
tive extension that is recognized by at least some proponents of active externalism. In
their original treatment of the extended mind thesis, for example, Clark and Chalmers
(1998) suggest that there is no reason, in principle, why socially extended forms of
cognition should not exist:
Could my mental states be partly constituted by the states of other thinkers? We
see no reason why not, in principle. In an unusually interdependent couple, it
is entirely possible that one partner’s beliefs will play the same sort of role for
the other as the notebook plays for Otto. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 17)
In spite of all this, claims about socially extended cognition remain controversial.
This is due, at least in part, to worries about the extent to which other agents can meet
the sort of criteria required for cognitive extension, for example, the trust and glue
criteria proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998) (see Section 2).
It is here, I suggest, that a focus on the Internet could be of philosophical value.
This is because the Internet plays a crucial role in shaping the nature of our social
interactions and engagements, transforming the way in which a broad array of social
11Of course, what is deemed to be significant, and thus worthy of discussion, is itself something that is,
at least in part, determined by the social environment, e.g. the beliefs, attitudes, values and interests of the
social group.
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activities are undertaken. As a result of this transformation, it is possible that the
Internet helps to surmount (via technological means) some of the barriers that would
otherwise prohibit the practical realization of socially extended cognition. We can
thus imagine Internet technologies being specifically designed so as to satisfy the
conditions that are deemed to be conducive to socially extended cognition. Such
conditions may, of course, be impossible to achieve in the case of conventional
face-to-face interactions, and it is for this reason that discussions regarding socially
extended cognition are perhaps best situated in the context of the Internet (especially
the Social Web).12
Not only does the Internet change the nature of our social interactions, it also
alters the nature of what it means to rely on the social environment for the purposes
of cognitive support. In order to help us see this, consider a number of applications
that rely on what is called real-time or continuous crowdsourcing (see Lasecki and
Bigham 2013). In general, these applications seek to capitalize on the availability of
large groups of individuals in order to support the execution of particular tasks. The
VizWiz system, for example, is a system that seeks to support blind people in dealing
with the challenges of a visual environment (Bigham et al. 2010). VizWiz enables
blind individuals to upload images from a smartphone and then receive descriptions
of the image from other individuals in what is described as ‘nearly real-time’. Such
systems support the idea that the wider social environment can be recruited into a
form of cognitively potent information processing, one which then serves to influ-
ence the thoughts and actions of a visually impaired individual. There is an obvious
parallel here with the case of Otto and his notebook. Despite some clear differences
in the nature of the cognitive processing routines that are being performed (e.g. visual
processing versus mnemonic recall), as well as differences in the nature of the rel-
evant material realizers (i.e. socio-technical system versus notebook), the two cases
are roughly equivalent: in both cases, we have a form of disability that is being
addressed by virtue of the kind of engagements that are made with respect to the
extra-organismic environment.
In addition to the issues raised by real-time crowdsourcing and the technological
transformation of human social interaction, there is, I suggest, a further way in which
the Internet is relevant to the topic of socially extended cognition. The main point of
interest here concerns the emergence of technological systems that are intended to
function as intelligent personal assistants, conversational partners or even artificial
social companions (e.g. Wilks 2010). Systems such as Siri and Cortana are emblem-
atic of the interest that major technology vendors have in supporting new forms of
engagement and interaction with the technological domain—especially ones that cap-
italize on our existing suite of communicative abilities. To an ever-greater extent, such
systems are able to emulate the features of human-to-human verbal exchanges. This
raises an important issue; for inasmuch as these systems start to resemble the nature
12Such a shift in philosophical focus is likely to be desirable, in any case, especially when one considers
the impact of online social networking systems (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) on the structure of
human social processes. There is a potential danger here of the philosophical debate failing to keep track
of the rapidly shifting reality of human social behavior.
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of our traditional social interactions and engagements, we can ask whether they might
lead to a progressive blurring of the erstwhile crisp distinction between socially-
and technologically extended forms of cognition. In other words, as technological
systems begin to resemble conventional social partners, perhaps the conceptual dis-
tinction between socially extended and technologically extended cognition is itself
called into question.
This potential blurring of conceptual boundaries is important when it comes to
the way in which the distinction between the social and the technological is used
in the context of recent philosophical arguments. Consider, for example, the way
in which differences between the social and technological realms are used to pro-
mote asymmetric treatments regarding the extendedness of belief-forming processes
(Goldberg 2010; 2012). Goldberg (2012) thus suggests that other human agents can
form part of an extended belief-forming process but non-human agents (e.g. techno-
logical devices and instruments) cannot. This distinction is presumably based on the
relative differences between human and non-human agents when it comes to their
role as information providers. But once we accept that some kinds of technological
system can function in the same sort of way as a conventional human partner, the
basis for this distinction looks to be, at best, unclear.
To help reinforce this particular point, suppose that you are walking through the
woods with your voice-enabled digital companion and you happen to hear the song of
an unknown bird species. Curious about the source of the song, you verbally instruct
your digital companion to identify the species of bird responsible for the song. Your
digital companion then invokes the services of a birdsong classification program13
and promptly communicates the correct answer to you in verbal form. In cases such
as these, it is unclear why we should regard the contributions of a digital compan-
ion as somehow distinct from those of a human companion. If it makes sense to
see one’s belief-forming process as materially extended based on the testimony of a
human expert (an ornithologist, let us say), why not see the testimony of a more-or-
less constant, trusted and reliable digital companion as underwriting similar forms of
cognitive extension?
Moving beyond the simple case of question-answer systems, which (to some) may
not feature the sort of dynamic reciprocal engagement that warrants treatment in cog-
nitive terms (see Palermos 2014b), we can surely entertain the possibility of future
forms of computational agent that help to shape the trajectory of our mnemonic and
creative endeavours. Imagine, for example, a future Siri agent that participates in
the kinds of collaborative recall and elaborative rehearsal processes mentioned above
(Sutton et al. 2010; Smart 2010). In this case, despite the fact that we are interact-
ing with a technological (as opposed to a biological) agent, there seems little reason
to discount the Siri agent as an intrinsic part of some ‘socially-extended’ cogni-
tive processing routine. In fact, once we consider the availability and accessibility
of such synthetic agents, we may be inclined to see them as more apt for cognitive
incorporation than their non-synthetic human counterparts.
13There are, in fact, multiple examples of such programs already available. See, for example, ‘Bird Song
Id’ by Isoperla (http://us.isoperlaapps.com/BirdSongIdUSA.html).
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7 Human-Extended Machine Cognition
The agent that lies at the heart of an episode of extended cognizing is, in almost all
cases, an individual human agent. In other words, it is the cognitive processes of the
individual human agent that are deemed to be extended as a result of some form of
bio-technological or bio-social bonding. Consistent with this view, many proponents
of extended cognition have embraced what has come to be known as the Hypothesis
of Organism-Centred Cognition (HOC) (Clark 2008). This is presented as the idea that
Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally extends into the environ-
ment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organism, the
brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active element. Cognition
is organism centered even when it is not organism bound. (Clark 2008, p. 139)
By situating a biological organism at the heart of an extended cognitive system,
the HOC mandates a bio-centric view of extended cognition. That is to say, the HOC
encourages us to see cognitive extension as something that is centered on a particular
biological agent, typically a human individual.
In the current section, I want to challenge this idea and suggest that the Internet
enables us to consider an entirely new form of extended cognitive organization. The
kind of system I have in mind here is based on the idea that the points of contact
we have with the online environment—the points at which we interface (and per-
haps bond) with Internet-accessible resources—are able to function as bidirectional
‘plug points’. In other words, the rich array of devices that we now use to exploit the
resources of the online realm are not just the points at which we plug into the online
environment, they are also the points at which a variety of online systems are able to
plug into us! It is these bidirectional points of contact with the Internet that enable
us Internet-using human agents to be co-opted into extended nexuses of cognitively
potent information processing, ones which are managed, monitored and maintained
by various forms of machine-based intelligence. The result, I suggest, is that we
can see the Internet, in combination with a multiplicity of artificial intelligence sys-
tems, cognitive computing platforms and machine learning algorithms, as providing
the basis for forms of extended cognizing in which it is the human agents that form
part of the physical machinery for non-biological forms of cognitive processing. For
the sake of convenience, let us refer to this specific form of cognitive extension as
Human-Extended Machine Cognition (HEMC).
The HEMC concept, it should be clear, alters our view as to the locus of cognitive
control and agency within an extended cognitive organization. In addition to the idea
that it is the cognitive routines of human individuals that are materially extended as a
result of various forms of bio-technological and bio-social bonding (the conventional
focus of active externalist theorizing), we now have to contend with the idea that it
is the cognitive routines (and associated capabilities) of machine-based agents that
are extended as a result of the sorts of (techno-social) bonding opportunities that are
made available by the Internet. This idea is important, not only because it challenges
the bio-centric bias of contemporary philosophical discourse, but also because it may
help to advance the cause of artificial intelligence research. For if it is indeed our
ability to enter into deep and complex relationships with extra-organismic resources
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that best explains the distinctive features of human intelligence (see Clark 2003), then
perhaps the best way to extend the reach of extant artificial intelligence systems is to
likewise focus on their ability to participate in materially hybrid forms of cognitive
processing.
There will be much that is no doubt controversial here. The main point of con-
tention for those seeking to defend the possibility of HEMC is likely to arise in
respect of the notion of ‘machine cognition’ (e.g. does it make sense to talk of
machines as cognitive systems?). In addition, for those who seek to argue that the
Internet facilitates the emergence of HEMC systems, there are likely to be additional
points of tension regarding the extent to which human agents are apt for cognitive
incorporation (do human agents, for example, exhibit the requisite kind of functional
poise that would enable them to be considered as constitutive elements in extended
cognitive circuits?).14
In respect of the first of these points—the one relating to machine cognition—
I assume that many philosophers of a materialist persuasion will not wish to deny
the possibility that some kind of non-biological system could be accorded cogni-
tive status. In other words, they will not wish to rule out the possibility that some
form of synthetic computational system could engage in processes that are seen to
be cognitive in nature. The issue of machine cognition is thus one that is closely
aligned with a number of foundational issues in cognitive science, including those
associated with computationalism (Piccinini 2012) and computational functionalism
(Polger 2009).
In respect of the second point—the one relating to the functional poise of the
human social environment—I suggest that it helps to consider the degree of social
penetration and entrenchment that has been established by the Internet. Over the past
several decades, the Internet has become so much a part of our everyday activities
that it is sometimes hard to distinguish where the Internet stops and society begins
(see Smart and Shadbolt 2014). And relative to this level of social penetration, it is
possible, I suggest, to think of the human social environment as a more-or-less ever-
present resource that can be harnessed, exploited and (to some extent) manipulated
in more-or-less the same sort of manner as an individual human agent might interact
with an array of readily available physical artefacts. I suggest, therefore, that the
Internet enables us to regard the elements of the human social environment (from the
HEMC perspective) in pretty much the same sort of way as we regard the elements
of the physical environment from the perspective of individual (organism-centered)
forms of extended cognition.
The HEMC concept is clearly deserving of a more detailed treatment than the
one that can be offered here. In spite of the cursory coverage, however, the impli-
cations of the idea relative to ongoing debates concerning (e.g.) organism-centered
cognition and the transformative potential of bio-technological hybridization should
be relatively clear. The possibility of HEMC thus strikes at the heart of the HOC,
14The nature of these tensions, it should be clear, echo those that are encountered in the mainstream
extended mind literature (Adams and Aizawa 2010; Clark 2010a).
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forcing us to question the bio-centric intuitions upon which it is based. In addition,
the HEMC concept helps to broaden the scope of current philosophical debates. It
enables us, for example, to establish a useful point of contact between issues of com-
plementarity in both the extended mind literature (see Sutton 2010) and the machine
intelligence literature (e.g. Kapoor et al. 2008, Branson et al. 2014). There is, more-
over, a growing sense that the Internet enables us to tap into human capabilities for
the purposes of accomplishing tasks that were previously beyond the reach of our
species (Michelucci and Dickinson 2016; Hendler and Berners-Lee 2010). One has
only to look at the burgeoning literature on human computation systems (Michelucci
2013; Law and von Ahn 2011) and citizen science systems (Lintott and Reed 2013;
Cardamone et al. 2009) to appreciate the growing interest in issues of socio-com-
putational and bio-technological hybridization. It is here, I suggest, that we can begin
to see how the notion of HEMC helps to bring a range of important inter-disciplinary
linkages into sharper focus. In particular, the interest in materially heterogeneous
cognitive organizations in contemporary philosophy of mind is perfectly aligned
with the current efflorescence of research efforts (spread across a range of scien-
tific disciplines) that seek to integrate human agents into episodes of machine-based
computational processing (see Michelucci 2013;2016).
8 Conclusion
The application of active externalist theorizing to the Internet gives rise to the notion
of Internet-extended cognition—the idea that the Internet can serve as part of the
physical fabric that realizes human mental states and processes. This is, in fact, a con-
cept that warrants further philosophical and cognitive scientific attention. Firstly, the
Internet is a major part of the technological and informational environment in which
human agents are materially embedded. To an ever-greater extent such technologies
are, in the words of Floridi (2014), ‘reshaping human reality’. For this reason, the
Internet is an important target of active externalist theorizing. This is especially so if
the philosophical debate is to keep pace with the changing profile of human cognitive
and epistemic endeavours.
A second reason why the concept of Internet-extended cognition is important is
because of the way that it helps to reveal issues that are not as readily apparent in
cases involving technologically low-grade resources (e.g. conventional pen and paper
resources). Such issues can, on occasion, strike at the heart of philosophical debates
concerning the extended mind. We saw, for example, that a consideration of Internet-
extended cognition highlights the need for a subtle re-crafting of the criteria that
are sometimes used to authenticate cases of cognitive extension (see Section 2.2).
We also saw that a consideration of Internet-extended cognition can introduce us to
relatively novel forms of cognitive extension. These include conjoined minds (see
Section 4), Internet-enabled forms of socially extended cognition (see Section 6), and
(perhaps most importantly) forms of cognitive extension in which it is the human
social environment that serves as the extended supervenience base for the cognitive
routines of machine-based systems (see Section 7). What is important to bear in mind
here is that none of these points of potential philosophical progress are revealed by
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the sort of (technologically low-grade) cases of cognitive extension that tend to be
focus of the majority of extant philosophical treatments. This is one of the reasons
why Internet-extended cognition is of crucial importance to the philosophy of mind
and cognitive science communities.
Throughout the current paper, I have sought to survey a range of issues that arise in
relation to the notion of Internet-extended cognition. One of these issues concerns the
extent to which the Internet is able to support real-world cases of cognitive extension.
This applies as much to the case of technologically extended cognition (see Section 2
and 3) as it does to the case of socially extended cognition (see Section 6). One of the
important points to emerge from the discussion of this issue was the way in which
our contact with the Internet is changing as a result of shifts in the technological
landscape (e.g. the proliferation of wearable technologies) and shifts in the represen-
tation of online information (e.g. the move towards a Web of Data). This highlights a
crucial issue when it comes to discussions about the potential of the Internet to sup-
port the emergence of extended cognitive systems: the Internet is in a state of rapid
technological flux and we should not therefore assume that the range of opportuni-
ties for cognitively potent forms of bio-technological hybridization are necessarily
exhausted by a selective focus on one particular form of interactive engagement with
the online world.
Another issue concerned the putative transformation of our cognitive and epis-
temic capabilities as a result of Internet-based forms of cognitive extension (see
Section 5). In general, the Internet has been seen to betoken a significant expansion
in our epistemic capabilities (Ludwig 2015; Bjerring and Pedersen 2014); however,
I have attempted to sound a note of caution here. While we might assume that
Internet-extended cognition leads to an effective supersizing of our epistemic power
and potential, things are not so straightforward when the epistemic status of the
Internet-extended cognizer is evaluated with respect to virtue-theoretic epistemolog-
ical theories, especially those that emphasize the role of cognitive ability in securing
claims of positive epistemic standing (Greco 2007; 2010; 2012).
All of the issues surveyed in this review are ones that highlight the value and
importance of inter-disciplinary collaboration. Given the nature of the target techno-
logical system (i.e. the Internet), it is likely that collaboration between the philosophy
of mind, the cognitive science and the WAIS community will be of particular
importance in shaping the course of future philosophical debates. Such forms of
inter-disciplinary collaboration are likely to be especially relevant when it comes to
our understanding of the cognitive and epistemic impacts of the Internet, both for
ourselves and the machines we build. Given that the Internet is likely to play an
increasingly important role in shaping the profile of our social, cognitive and epis-
temic endeavours, it is imperative that we ensure that the properties of emerging
technologies are ones that will enable future forms of intelligence (both human and
machine) to thrive and flourish in the new cognitive ecology of the online, digital world.
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